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The COVID-19 pandemic has reshaped the demand for goods and services worldwide.
A combination of a public health emergency, economic distress, and disinformation-driven
panic have pushed customers and vendors towards the shadow economy. In particular dark
web marketplaces (DWMs), commercial websites easily accessible via free software, have
gained significant popularity. Here, we analyse 472,372 listings extracted from 23 DWMs
between January 1, 2020 and July 7, 2020. We identify 518 listings directly related to
COVID-19 products and monitor the temporal evolution of product categories including
PPE, medicines (e.g., hydroxyclorochine), and medical frauds (e.g., vaccines). Finally, we
compare trends in their temporal evolution with variations in public attention, as measured
by Twitter posts and Wikipedia page visits. We reveal how the online shadow economy
has evolved during the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight the importance of a continuous
monitoring of DWMs, especially when real vaccines or cures become available and poten-
tially in short supply. We anticipate our analysis will be of interest both to researchers
and public agencies focused on the protection of public health.
Introduction
COVID-19 gained global attention when China suddenly quarantined the city of Wuhan on January 23,
2020.1 Declared a pandemic by the World Health Organization on March 11, 2020, at the moment of
writing the virus has infected more than 18,000,000 people and caused over 650,000 deaths worldwide.2
Measures such as social distancing, quarantine, travel restrictions, testing, and tracking have proven vital
to contain the COVID-19 pandemic.3
Restrictions have shaken the global economy and reshaped the demand for goods and services world-
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wide, with an estimated 2.5 − 3% GDP loss each month since the crisis started.4 Demand for many
products has fallen, for example Brent oil decreased from 68.90 USD a barrel on January 1, 2020 to
43.52 USD as of August 2, 2020.5,6 Meanwhile demand for other products, like toilet paper ,7 dra-
matically increased. As a result of increased demand, some products are in short supply. For example
individual protective masks were sold in the United States at 7 USD on February 2, 20208 and the
price of alcohol disinfectant doubled on July 1, 2020 in Japan.9 As a result, anti-gouging regulations
were introduced to control price, which significantly affected the public attention on products related
to COVID-19.10 As this trend has continued for months, further exacerbated by online disinformation,
numerous customers have sought to fulfill their needs through illicit online channels.11,12
DWMs offer an easy access to the shadow economy through user-friendly websites accessible via
specialized browsers, like The Onion Router (Tor).13 These online markets offer a variety of goods
including drugs, firearms, credit cards and fake IDs.14 The most popular currency on DWMs is Bitcoin15
but other cryptocurrencies are accepted for payment as well. The first modern DWM was the Silk Road,
launched in 201116 and shut down by the FBI17 in 2013. Since then, dozen more DWMs have sprung up
and many have shut down due to police action, hacks or scams. Today, DWMs form an ecosystem18 that
has proven extremely resilient to law-enforcement. Whenever a marketplace is shut down, users swiftly
migrate to alternative active marketplaces and the economic activity recovers within a matter of days.19
In this study, we analyse 472,372 listings extracted from 23 DWMs between January 1, 2020 and
July 7, 2020. We identify 518 COVID-19 specific listings that range from protective masks20 to hydrox-
ychloroquine medicine.21 These listings were observed 7,159 times during this period, allowing us to
investigate their temporal evolution. We then compare this COVID-19 related shadow economy with
public attention measured through Twitter posts (tweets)22 and Wikipedia page visits.23 Finally, we
inspect listings that mentioned delays in shipping or sales because of COVID-19. Our results significantly
extend previous analyses that surveyed 222 COVID-19 specific listings extracted from 20 DWMs on a
single day (April 3, 2020)24 and - to the best of our knowledge - offer the most comprehensive overview
of the DWM activity generated by the ongoing pandemic.
Background: dark web marketplaces
The online shadow economy is as old as the Internet. The first reported illegal online deal involved drugs
and took place in 1972.25 The World Wide Web26 facilitated the emergence of online illicit markets27,28
but the first markets could not guarantee anonymity and facilitated the traceability of users by law
enforcement.29
Modern DWMs originated and still operate online, but outside the World Wide Web, in an encrypted
part of the Internet whose contents are not indexed by standard web search-engines.30 The Silk Road
marketplace was the first modern DWM, launched in 2011.16 It combined the use of the Tor browser13
to communicate and Bitcoin15 to exchange money, allowing the anonymous online trading of drugs and
other illegal products.31–33 After the FBI shut down Silk Road in 2013,17 new marketplaces quickly
appeared, offering drugs, firearms, credit cards, and fake IDs.14 These markets also adapted to further
increase the level of privacy and security offered to users,34,35 such as, the Invisible Internet Project
(I2P)36 and escrow checkout services.37
DWM trade today is worth at least several hundreds millions of USD per year, and involves hundreds
of thousands of buyers and vendors.17–19,38–40 As a result, law enforcement agencies have put consid-
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erable efforts to combat them.17,39,40 Furthermore, DWMs have been targets of cybercriminal actors
through use of distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, hacking attempts, and some even shut down
autonomously due to administrators stealing funds from customers directly.41,42 However, DWMs have
organised in a robust ecosystem which has proven exceptionally resilient to closures and whenever a
marketplace is closed, the users trading higher volumes of Bitcoins migrate to active marketplaces or
established new ones.19
The resilience and functioning operations of modern DWMs are possible partially thanks to numerous
websites and forums where users can share their experience. One example is Dread,43 a Reddit-like forum
created in 2018 after the closure of the dedicated pages on Reddit.44 Other ad-hoc platforms exist to
monitor whether known marketplaces are active or currently unavailable.45–48 Other mechanisms to
enhance the resilience of these marketplaces and build trust towards the marketplace and its vendors
include feedbacks and ratings.18 In most marketplaces, buyers have to leave feedback and a rating
after a purchase, similarly to what happens on legal online marketplaces. Additionally, marketplace
administrators often act as vendor moderators by banning vendors or specific categories of products.
Examples include DarkBay, where banned categories include human trafficking, contract killing and
weapons,46 or Monopoly marketplace, where COVID-19 fake vaccine listings were recently banned by
moderators.49
It is hard to estimate how many live dark web marketplaces currently exist. Recent reports include
independent researcher Gwern, which at April 22, 2020 identified 19 live platforms,50 the website dark-
netstats, which at the May 27, 2020 registered 10 live “established” marketplaces,51 and the already
cited report24 which crawled 20 different websites. Currently established marketplaces include Empire,
Hydra and White House marketplaces.
Data and methods
Dark web marketplaces
Listings were obtained by web crawling DWMs. Web crawling consists of extracting data from websites
and is performed by specialized software. Web crawling DWMs is a challenging task because crawlers
must bypass several protective layers. Most of the DWMs require authentication and some even require
a direct invitation from a current member. Strong CAPTCHAs52 are implemented to avoid an otherwise
easy and automated access to the online marketplace. Several research groups tried to overcome these
challenges. For instance, the HTTrack software was used in;16 a combination of PHP, the cURL library,
and MySQL was proposed in;53 the python library scrapy was adopted in;54 and an automated method-
ology using the AppleScript language was utilized in.55 There are currently very few open source tools
available,52,56 leaving companies and federal agencies to often rely on commercial software.57 Down-
loading content from DWMs remains a challenging task, which becomes even harder when the objective
of the research study requires monitoring multiple marketplaces for a prolonged period of time.
Our dataset contains listings crawled by 23 DWMs between January 1, 2020 and July 7, 2020 by
Flashpoint Intelligence.58 The pipeline of crawling consists in entering DWMs and downloading key
attributes for each active listing, as highlighted in figure 1. Each DWM was crawled at least 90 different
days. We categorized the COVID-19 specific listings into five categories; PPE, medicines, medical frauds,
tests, and ventilators. Only a fraction of the selected listings were actual COVID-19 specific listings, since
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Listing Title
Listing Price
Vendor Name
Listing Body
Shipping Information
Figure 1: Example of DWM listing. Screenshot of a chloroquine listing in the DarkBay/Dbay market-
place, where we highlight some of its salient attributes. Among the attributes considered in this work
and shown in table 4, “Time” and “Marketplace name” attributes are not present in this screenshot,
while the “Quantity” attribute is not fixed by the vendor.
mitigation measures to prevent COVID-19 spreading have also impacted illegal trades of other listings.
For instance, a vendor might sell cocaine and mention shipping delays due to the COVID-19. We
included such cases in the category COVID-19 mentions. Categories and relative examples of the listings
are presented in table 1. For details about data pre-processing, see Appendix A, where we explain how
we select listings related with COVID-19 and how we classify them in categories. We remark that our
pre-processing pipeline is biased towards the English language, and this constitutes a limitation of our
work.
Table 1: Categories used to classify the selected COVID-19 dataset. The first five categories constitute
COVID-19 specific listings, while the last one, called COVID-19 mentions, includes listings mentioning
one of the keywords in table 5 without selling actual COVID-19 specific listings.
Category Examples
PPE gloves, gowns, masks, n95
Medicines azithromycin, chloroquine, azithromycin, favipiravir, remdesivir
Medical Frauds antidotes, vaccines, allegedly curative recreational drug mixes
Tests diagnosis, test
Ventilators medical ventilators
COVID-19 mentions computer, drugs, scam (excluding listings in the medical frauds category)
Overall, our dataset includes a total of 472,372 unique listings, which can be observed a total of
4,088,840 times between January 1, 2020 and July 7, 2020. In table 2 we report the breakdown of the
number of unique listings and their total observations in each of the 23 DWMs. In 11 marketplaces (Black
Guns, Cannabay, Darkseid, ElHerbolario, Genesis, Hydra, MEGA Darknet, Rocketr, Selly, Skimmer
Device, and Venus Anonymous) we did not find any mention of the COVID-19. This makes sense as this
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markets are less generalized and primarily focused on specific goods with specific listing text structure.
A brief description of each marketplace together with its specialization can be found in table 7. In
the remaining 12 marketplaces, there are a total of 4,010 unique listings related to COVID-19, which
constitutes less than 1% of the entire dataset. These listings were mostly composed of drugs that reported
discounts or delays in shipping due to the COVID-19. Listings concerning more specific COVID-19
goods such as masks, ventilators, and tests were available on 7 marketplaces (Connect, DarkBay/DBay,
DarkMarket, Empire, CanadaHQ, White House, and Yellow Brick). There were 518 total COVID-19
specific listings in this markets which were observed 7,159 times during the analysed time period.
Table 2: This table reports the number of days each marketplace was crawled, the number of unique
listings, all and COVID-19 specific, and the number of listing observations, all and COVID-19 specific.
Canadian HQ indicates The Canadian HeadQuarters marketplace.
Name marketplace
Days Listings Listings Observations Observations
crawled All COVID-19 specific All COVID-19 specific
Black Market Guns 163 18 0 2,934 0
CanadaHQ 94 21,853 3 145,202 53
Cannabay 119 1,074 0 1,303 0
Cannazon 100 2,760 0 4,606 0
Connect 179 476 2 13,579 23
DarkBay/DBay 127 105,921 421 554,535 6570
DarkMarket 92 32,272 19 37,742 20
Darkseid 189 8 0 1,512 0
ElHerbolario 186 13 0 1,430 0
Empire 107 26,010 33 93,163 46
Genesis 188 216,792 0 2,174,217 0
Hydra 189 297 0 37,665 0
MEGA Darknet 135 754 0 1,596 0
Plati.Market 189 11,678 0 17,214 0
Rocketr 189 460 0 7,843 0
Selly 91 462 0 1,523 0
Shoppy.gg 189 8,412 0 486,819 0
Skimmer Device 189 12 0 2,268 0
Tor Market 130 634 0 25,328 0
Venus Anonymous 177 84 0 14,644 0
White House 96 21,377 5 320,360 118
Willhaben 189 14,626 0 45,774 0
Yellow Brick 117 6,379 33 97,583 329
Total > 90 472,372 518 4,088,840 7,159
Twitter
We sampled tweets related to COVID-19 using a freely available dataset introduced in.22 We downloaded
the tweets id from the public github repository. We then used the provided script to recover the original
tweets through the python library twarc. We studied the temporal evolution of the number of tweets
mentioning selected keywords, like chloroquine. In line with our dataset of DWM listings, most of the
tweets considered were written in English and the time period considered ranges from January 21, 2020
to July 3, 2020.
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Wikipedia
We used the publicly available Wikipedia API23 to collect data about the number of visits at specific
pages related with COVID-19, like chloroquine. The Wikipedia search engine was case sensitive and we
considered strings with the first letter uppercase, while the others lowercase. We looked for the number
Wikipedia page visits in the English language from January 1, 2020 to July 7, 2020.
Results
We assessed the impact of COVID-19 on online illicit trade along three main criteria. First, we focused
on the 7 marketplaces containing at least one COVID-19 specific listing, analysing their offers in terms of
the categories PPE, medicines, medical frauds, tests, and ventilators, as introduced in table 1. Second, we
considered the 12 marketplaces that included all least one listing in one of the categories in table 1, thus
adding listings in the COVID-19 mentions category in our analysis. We investigated the relationship
between major COVID-19 events, public attention, and the time evolution of the number of active
listings. Third, we quantified the indirect impact that COVID-19 had on all 23 marketplaces under
consideration by tracking the percentage of listings mentioning the themes of lockdown, delays and sales.
We linked their frequency to major COVID-19 events.
Categories of listings
Here, we focus on the 518 COVID-19 specific listings present in our dataset, observed 7,159 times be-
tween January 2020 and July 2020. PPE is the most represented category, with 343 unique listings
(66.2% of COVID-19 specific listings) observed 5,536 times (77.3% of observations of COVID-19 specific
listings). The second most represented category is medicines, with 132 (25.5%) unique listings observed
1,276 (17.8% of all) times. Some medicines listings, which are often sold together, included 59 chloro-
quine listings, 56 hydroxychloroquine listings, and 30 azythromicin listings. Other medicines included 5
favipiravir listings, 3 remdesivir listings, and 1 lopinavir listing. A breakdown of the medicines category
together with a brief description of the specific drugs can be found in table 8, and multiple medicines
are sometimes sold in the same listing. We classified 31 (6.0%) unique listings as medical frauds, which
are listings that promised immunity from COVID-19 (no such product exists, at the moment of writing),
or supposed devices able to detect COVID-19 in the air. These listings also included illicit drug mixes
sold as cures. We also registered 10 test (1.9% of COVID-19 specific listings) and 2 ICU ventilator
(0.4%) listings. More details on these listings together with some examples are reported in Appendix B.
The total number of vendors selling COVID-19 specific listings was 131. Additionally, sellers posted
multiple listings. In fact, 81 of them sold PPE (61.8%), 54 sold medicines (41.2%), 20 sold medical
frauds (15.3%), 9 sold tests (6.9%), and 2 sold ventilators (1.5%). The information in this paragraph
are summarized in table 3.
It is important to note that vendors often do not provide complete information on their listings but
rather invite direct communication. In 403 (77.8%) unique listings, the vendor invited potential customers
to communicate via email or messaging applications like WhatsApp, Wickr Me, and Snapchat. Thus,
478 (92.3%) COVID-19 specific listings contained no information about the offered amount of goods, 408
(78.8%) did not provide shipping information and 13 (2.5%) did not disclose the listing price.
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Table 3: Summary statistics for the considered categories of listings. For each category, we included
the number of unique listings, observations, and vendors. If the same vendor sold listings in different
categories, we counted it as one unique vendor.
Category Unique listings Total observations Vendors
PPE 343 (66.2%) 5,536 (77.3%) 81 (61.8%)
Medicines 132 (25.5%) 1,276 (17.8%) 54 (41.2%)
Medical Frauds 31 (6.0%) 235 (3.3%) 20 (15.3%)
Tests 10 (1.9%) 34 (0.5%) 9 (6.9%)
Ventilators 2 (0.4%) 78 (1.1%) 2 (1.5%)
COVID-19 518 (100%) 7,159 (100%) 131 (100%)
The median price of PPE was 2 USD and they were the least expensive products, followed by
medicines with 34 USD, tests with 70 USD, medical frauds with 200 USD, and ventilators with 1,400
USD. The distribution of prices for these categories can be found in figure 2(a), showing that many
listings had a low price around a few USD of less and only few listings exceeded thousands or more
USD. The cumulative value of the detected unique listings is 531, 413 USD, where we excluded listing
with prices larger than 40, 000 USD due to manual inspection. Vendors postings listings at high price
wished to halt sales of an item with the expectation of selling it again in the future, and considering
these listings would largely overestimate the total value of the listings sold.18 The shipping information
declared in the analysed listings involved a total of 12 country or regions. Most of the vendors are willing
to ship worldwide. Shipping from different continents is possible because some vendors explicitly declare
that they have multiple warehouses across the globe, while shipping to any continent is done through
specialized delivery services. The United States is the second largest exporter and shipping destination.
Germany is the third largest exporter but no vendors explicitly mentioned it as a shipping destination.
Complete shipping information is available in figure 2(b). Some examples of the COVID-19 specific
listings are available in the Appendix B.1.
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Figure 2: (a) Box plot of the distribution of listing prices for each COVID-19 category. The box ranges
from the lower to the upper quartile, with the horizontal line indicating the median. The whiskers extend
up to the 5th and 95th percentiles respectively. The dots represent outliers. (b) Shipping information
in COVID-19 specific listings. Note that 408 (or 78.8%) of these listings did not provide any shipping
information.
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Figure 3: (a) Word cloud for “Listing title” in COVID-19 specific listings. (b) Category breakdown of
COVID-19 specific listings in the specific marketplace that offered them. (c) Fraction of vendors selling
at least one COVID-19 specific listing. (d) Vendor specialisation. Most vendors responsible for at least
one COVID-19 specific listing also sell other listings, and in greater number.
Figure 3(a) presents a word cloud built from the titles of the selected COVID-19 specific listings. The
wordcloud was built from 1-grams, meaning single words, excluding common English words and stop
words. It illustrates that DWM vendors were particularly aware of the worldwide need of face masks
because “face mask” were the most used words in the selected COVID-19 specific listings. The COVID-
19 pandemic was referred to as either “coronavirus,” “corona,” “covid,” or “covid19.” Interestingly, we
did not find any mention about the word “pandemic” itself. Among COVID-19 medicines, “hydrox-
ychloroquine” and “chloroquine” were the most popular ones, with fewer mentions of “azithromycin,”
“medicated,” and “medical” products in general.
DarkBay/DBay contained the majority of the COVID-19 specific listings in our dataset, amounting
to 421 (81.3%). The most available unique listings in DarkBay/DBay were PPE, which totaled 291. We
also found 103 medicines, 24 medical frauds, 1 tests, and 2 ventilators. The number of listings available
in the other marketplaces was: 33 in Yellow Brick, 19 in DarkMarket, 2 in Connect, 33 in Empire, 3 in
The Canadian HeadQuarters, and 5 in White House, as shown in table 2. The entire breakdown of the
number of COVID-19 specific listings detected in each category is available in figure 3(b).
In figure 3(c), we ranked the marketplaces for their share of vendors selling COVID-19 specific listings.
The total number of vendors behind COVID-19 specific listings in our dataset is 131. Most vendors sold
only one COVID-19 specific listing, while few of them sold more than ten different COVID-19 specific
listings. In Appendix D, we analysed the distribution of COVID-19 specific listing for each vendor. We
found that it was heterogeneous according to a power-law with an exponent equal to −2.0 and 80% of the
vendors had less than 5 listings, as shown in figure 7. In DarkBay/DBay more than 10% of the vendors
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were selling COVID-19 specific listings, while in Empire, The Canadian HeadQuarters, and White House
this fraction was fewer than 1%. Finally, figure 3(d) shows that essentially no vendors specialised on
COVID-19 products, with only 6 vendors selling more COVID-19 specific listings than unrelated ones, 4
of which actually sold just one COVID-19 specific listing overall in our dataset.
Time evolution of DWM listings and public attention
The number of active unique listings evolved over time, as shown in figure 4(a). The first COVID-
19 specific listing in our dataset appeared on January 28, 2020, following the Wuhan lockdown.1 In
March 2020, lockdowns in many countries59,60 correspond to an increase in the number of these listings,
whose number kept increasing until May 2020. In June and July 2020, when worldwide quarantine
restrictions started to ease,61 we observed a decreasing trend in the selected COVID-19 specific listings.
Figure 4(b) shows the evolution of the total number of observed PPE and medicines, the two most
available COVID-19 specific listings in our dataset (see table 3). PPE followed a trend compatible with
the overall observations shown in figure 4(a), with a peak in May 2020 and a decrease afterwards, while
COVID-19 medicines, instead, remained approximately stable from April 2020.
The time evolution of the listing prices followed a different pattern. We considered the median price
and its 95% confidence interval of active COVID-19 specific listings in figure 4(c), and of active PPE
and medicines, in figure 4(d). Initially, the only COVID-19 specific listings concerned medicines and
specifically azithromycin, already sold on DWMs before the pandemic as an antibiotic. These listings
were not observed in the first part of March. Medicines reappeared in DWMs the week after the President
of the United States Donald Trump first mentioned chloroquine.62 Their median price was stable for the
remaining time period under consideration. PPE listings appeared for the first time in March 2020. The
median price of PPE was high for March and most of April, possibly due to speculation. Interestingly, at
the end of April, a vendor named “optimus,” active on DarkBay, started selling large quantities of PPE
at 1 USD, putting online many listings at the same time, thus drastically reducing the median price,
which remained low until July. Overall, “optimus” had 91 PPE listings during the registered period.
We also considered tweets and Wikipedia page visits as proxies for public attention. We focused our
analysis on the PPE category and on the three most present medicines in our dataset: hydroxychloro-
quine, chloroquine and azitrhomycin. Figure 5(a) shows that a first peak in public attention on PPE
was reached in late January 2020 following the Wuhan lockdown1 and a second peak in March 202063
when PPE listings started to appear in DWMs. The number of PPE listings reached their maximum in
May 2020. After May, PPE listings steadily decreased along with public attention. It is worth noting
that May also marked the end of the “first wave” of contagion in many European countries.64 The last
peak detected for the number of tweets in the beginning of July might be caused by the introduction of
a new methodology to collect tweets in the freely available dataset we considered.22
A similar relationship between mass media news, public attention, and DWMs was registered for the
listings regarding the 3 considered medicines, as shown in figure 5(b) and (d). Three peaks in public
attention were detected after three declarations from President Trump about these medicines62,65,66
and the number of active medicines listings closely followed. However, a closer look reveals the different
shapes of the Wikipedia page visits, tweets, and DWMs curves. Wikipedia saw a very high peak of page
visits after the first declaration from President Trump,62 and smaller peaks in correspondence in the
following declarations. Tweets instead saw peaks of attention of increasing height. DWM listings on the
contrary were much steadier in time and with little variation in the number of active listings.
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Figure 4: Longitudinal analysis of DWM activity. (a) Seven-days rolling average of active listings
mentioning COVID-19 and COVID-19 specific listings. (b) Seven-days rolling average of the observed
COVID-19 specific listings in the medicines and PPE categories. Dots represent daily observations.
Black dashed vertical lines in panels (a) and (b) corresponded to significant COVID-19 world events, see
Appendix C. (c) Seven-days median price with 95% confidence interval for COVID-19 specific listings.
(d) Seven-days median price with 95% confidence interval for active COVID-19 specific listings in the
PPE and medicines categories.
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Figure 5: DWMs and public attention. (a)-(c) Seven-days rolling average of active listings selling PPE,
together with the time evolution of the number of tweets referring to masks and of visits in the relative
Wikipedia page visits. (b)-(d) Similar comparison as in panels (a)-(c) but considering active listings of
hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine, and azithromycin. Black dashed vertical lines in panels (a) and (b)
mark significant events related with COVID-19, see Appendix C. See Appendix D for panels (a) and (b)
with a linear y-axis.
Impact of COVID-19 on other listings
We considered the indirect impact of COVID-19 on all the 23 DWMs in our dataset by looking at listings
mentioning lockdown, using keywords “lockdown” or “quarantine,” delay, using “delay” or “shipping
problem,” and sales, using “sale,” ”discount,” or “special offer.” Examples of listings reporting these
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keywords are available in Appendix B.2.
Figure 6(a)-(b)-(c) shows the percentage of listing in time mentioning these themes, considering the
full dataset. The percentage of all listings in the 23 DWMs mentioning lockdown never exceeded 1% and
reached its maximum in late April only, when many lockdown measures were adopted,1,59,60 as illustrated
in figure. 6(a). Delay mentions reached their peaks in March, April, and May, after major COVID-19
events, such as lockdowns,59,60 one million worldwide cases,67 and the situation in Europe starting to
improve,64 respectively, as shown in figure. 6(b). A similar pattern was visible for the percentage of all
listings mentioning sales. In addition, we observed that sales had a first peak corresponding to the New
Year, which is a common practice of many in-person legal shops, as displayed in figure 6(c). Interestingly,
despite observing that the increase in the percentage of all listings mentioning sales, delays, and lockdown
followed major events related with the pandemic, not all of these listings also mentioned COVID-19. We
further researched this by plotting which percentage of the relative listings also mentioned COVID-19
in figure 6(d). The percentage of listings mentioning that the current sales were due to COVID-19 was
less than 1%, while for delays this percentage reached up to 40%. For lockdown it was 100%, as one
can expect since lockdowns exist because of COVID-19. In the three selected cases, the percentages of
listings mentioning COVID-19 increased in time, following the in the global awareness about the current
pandemic.
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Figure 6: Percentage of all active listings mentioning the themes lockdown, delay and sales in panels
(a), (b), (c), respectively. (d) Percentage of active listings in panels (a), (b), (c) that mentioned also
COVID-19 in their listings. Black dashed vertical lines in panels (a), (b), and (c) corresponded to major
COVID-19 events, see Appendix C.
Conclusion and discussion
In summary, we investigated the presence of listings related to COVID-19 in 23 DWMs, monitored over
a six-months period in 2020. We considered COVID-19 mentions and COVID-19 specific listings find-
ing them in 12 and 7 DWMs, respectively. COVID-19 specific listings totaled 518 and represented less
than 1% of our dataset. The majority of COVID-19 specific listings offered PPE (66.2%), followed by
medicines (25.5%), medical frauds (6.0%), tests (1.9%), and ventilators (0.4%). Most COVID-19 specific
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listings did not report the quantity sold (92.3%) or shipping information (78.8%), and invited potential
customers to communicate via email or messaging applications, like WhatsApp (77.8%). Direct com-
munication fosters a trustworthy vendor-buyer relationship and may lay the ground for future tradings
outside DWMs. However, they expose users to higher risks of being traced by law enforcement.68
In our dataset, DarkBay/DBay is featured prominently among marketplaces offering COVID-19 spe-
cific listings. Ranking in the top 100 sites in the entire dark web,69 DarkBay/DBay is regarded as the
EBay of the dark web because it offers more listings categories than other DWMs.70 It was also frequently
accessible during the period of time monitored during this research, with an uptime of 86% during this
period, higher from the 77% uptime of Empire, the largest marketplace at the time of writing71
Our work corroborates previous findings and extends on them in several ways. The most extensive
report to date, to the best of our knowledge, examined the presence of COVID-19 specific listings in 20
DWMs on one single day (April 3, 2020).24 Despite a small subset of overlapping marketplaces between
that report and our study, (DarkBay/DBay, DarkMarket, Empire, White House, and Yellow Brick) we
both assessed that COVID-19 specific listings constituted less than 1% of the total listings in the DWM
ecosystem, these listings were mostly PPE, followed by medicines and they were found in only a few
DWMs, while non COVID-19 specific listings were widespread.
An important novelty of the present study, compared to the existing literature, is the analysis of the
temporal evolution of DWM behaviour and its relationship to public attention, as quantified through
tweets and Wikipedia page visits. Following the Wuhan lockdown,1 we observed a first peak in the public
attention, and a corresponding emergence of the COVID-19 specific listings. A second peak in public
attention occurred in March 2020, when quarantine measures were adopted by many European coun-
tries.59,60 Again, during the same period, the number of COVID-19 specific listings sharply increased.
Finally, when worldwide quarantine started to be eased61 in many countries, in June and July 2020, we
registered a decrease in public attention and in available COVID-19 specific listings.
Listing prices correlated with both variations in public attention and individual choices of few ven-
dors. Median price experienced a sharp increase in March 2020, probably due to speculation, and then
decreased in April due to the choice of a single vendor responsible for 91 listings, named “optimus.” The
vendor sold a large quantity of PPE at 1 USD only, which constituted the 37% of active PPE listings in
April 2020. Finally, we observed and increase in the percentage of all listings citing delays in shipping and
sale offers, which peaked in March, April, and May 2020. Similar to a prior work that found Wikipedia
page visits of a given drug to be a good predictor for its demand in DWMs,72 we provide further evidence
that the DWM ecosystem is embedded in our society and behaves organically to social changes.73 The
DWM ecosystem swiftly reacted to the pandemic, by offering goods in high demand, and even tried to
fulfill desires through evident scams, for example by offering vaccines already in March 2020, when no
tested vaccination existed.
Our research shares some limitations with previous studies, namely that not all active DWMs were
surveyed. For instance, we did not analyse 15 of the marketplaces explored in the previous report.24 It
must be noted, however, that the number of active marketplaces is constantly changing due to closures
or new openings;19 and obtaining a full coverage may result prohibitive also due to the active efforts of
DMWs to obstruct research studies and law enforcement investigations, for example through the use of
CAPTCHAs.
By revealing that DWMs offer of goods related to COVID-19 is rich and complex and that they
are responsive to public attention, we highlight the need for a close monitoring of the online shadow
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economy in the future months. For example, we expect that initial delays in the availability of a cure
and/or a vaccine would dramatically increase public interest for the online shadow economy, posing
concrete risks to public health. We plan to improve scrutiny of DWM activity by increasing the number
of monitored DWMs and a more extensive analysis of the impact on the pandemic on overall DWM trade
by considering changes in prices of non-COVID-19 specific listings, such as drugs, weapons or malware.
We anticipate that our results and future work will help inform the efforts of public agencies focused on
protecting consumer rights and health.74
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A Data pre-processing
In the following, we describe the DWMs dataset in more details, by focusing on how listings were stored
and how we formed the COVID-19 categories in table 1, that is, PPE, medicines, medical frauds, tests,
ventilators, and COVID-19 mentions.
Table 4: Selected attributes of the listings under consideration along with a brief explanation of their
respective purposes.
Attribute of a listing Explanation
“Listing body” Description of the listing as it appears in the DWM
“Listing title” Title of the listing as it appears in the DWM
“Marketplace name” Name of the DWM
“Shipping information” Where the listing is declared to ship from and to
“Time” When the listing is observed
“Quantity” Quantity of the listing sold
“Price” Price of listing
“Vendor” Unique identifier of the vendor
The listings appearing on the DWMs were crawled and stored according to selected attributes. While
a brief explanation of these attributes is already presented in table 4, here we focus on those attributes
which involved some pre-processing before the analysis, that is, “Shipping information,” “Quantity,”
and “Price.” The “Shipping information” attribute was initially stored considering what the vendor
declared. Then, it was standardised among vendors to correct any misspellings, using the standard
python library pycountry. Vendors may declare a specific country, like United States, a continent, like
Europe, or the entire world, which we standardise here as worldwide. The “Quantity” attribute was
instead retrieved from the title of the listing using Facebook open-source library Duckling ,75 then it was
manually checked and corrected during an annotation process. The “Price” attribute on DWMs was
displayed in the listings in various currencies, such as cryptocurrencies and fiat currencies. In order to
standardise and properly compare listing prices, we converted prices to USD at the daily conversion rate.
Rates were taken from Cryptocompare76 for cryptocurrencies, and from the European Central Bank77
for fiat currencies.
The attributes “Listing body” and “Listing title” in table 4, representing the title and description
of the listings, were used to select the COVID-19 categories in table 1. To this end, we prepared two
sets of keywords as shown in T table 5. Every selected COVID-19 listing contained either a word in the
“Listing body” that matched one keyword in the first set or a word in the “Listing title” that matched
one keyword in the second set. The rationale behind this choice was that the listing title was usually more
precise on the product sold, whereas the body might contain promotions of other items the vendor was
selling in other listings. At the same time, the vendor might mention COVID-19 in the body for various
reasons, which we analysed in the main text. In order to classify listings in either COVID-19 specific
listings (that is, PPE, medicines, medical frauds, tests, ventilators) or COVID-19 mentions, we ran a
regex query in google bigquery. We remark that the chosen method returned words containing a string
equal to one of our keywords. For instance, with the keyword chloroquin, we detected also chloroquine
and hydroxychloroquine. After this automatic filtering step, we manually checked the selected COVID-
19 related listings to further improve the accuracy of our sample. In order to minimize human error, at
least two authors of the present manuscript checked each of these listings. A limitation of our approach
was that keywords considered were in English. Therefore, even if drug names such as chloroquine were
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common to many languages and we detected some listings in a non-English language, our sample of
COVID-19 related listings was biased toward the English language.
Table 5: Keywords used to sample COVID-19 specific listings from the DWMs in table 2.
First set of keywords checked against the words included in the attribute “Listing body” in table 4
corona virus, coronavirus, covid, covid-19, covid19
Second set of keywords checked against the words included in the attribute “Listing title” in table 4
anakinra, antidote, antiviral, azithromycin, baloxavir, baricitinib, bemcentinib, chloroquin,
corona virus, coronavirus, covid, covid-19, covid19, darunavir, dexamethason, diagnosis,
diagnostic, favipiravir, ganciclovir, glove, gown, lopinavir, marboxil, mask, n95, n99,
oseltamivir, prevention, remdesivir, repurposed, ribavirin, ritonavir, sanitiser,
sanitizer, sarilumab, siltuximab, surgical, thermo scanner, thermo-scanner,
thermometr, thermoscanner, tocilizumab, umifenovir, vaccine, ventilator
While each listing had an associated url to determine its uniqueness, which allowed us to track listing
over time, vendors receiving bad reviews sometimes put identical copies of the same listing online. To
overcome this issue and correctly count the number of listings, we determined a listing as unique if it had
the combination of “Listing body,” “Listing title,” “Marketplace name,” and “Vendor” different than
any other listings. For instance, if two listings had the same title and body but were sold in two different
marketplaces, we considered them as two different listings. Also, we considered at most one observation
for each unique listing per day. The total number of unique listings and observations of these listings in
each DWM is available in table 2.
B Examples of listings related with COVID-19 in dark web
marketplaces
Here, we present detailed examples of the selected listings. We consider both COVID-19 specific listings
and COVID-19 mentions.
B.1 COVID-19 specific listings
The most popular category of COVID-19 specific listings was PPE, which included mainly face masks.
We detected that 91% of listings did not specify the amount of masks sold. Within those who declared
the amount sold, we found listings selling small quantities of masks, like “KN95 Face Mask for Corona
Virus box of 50” priced at 50 USD, while others proposed wholesale deals, as in “AFFORDABLE 20
BOXS OF SURGICAL FACE MASK (WHOLESALE PRICE)” in which 5000 masks were available at
2, 000 USD.
The second most popular COVID-19 category was medicines, composed mostly by chloroquine, hy-
droxychloroquine, and azythromicin. Like PPE, 84% of the times vendors did not specify the quantity
sold. When they did, it usually was for wholesale deals, as in “9000 tabs hydroxychloroquine 200mg
(USA AND CANADA ONLY)“ where 9,000 tabs were sold for 1,194 USD. The smallest quantity we
detected was 50 pills “chloroquine 50pills for 250$,” sold at 250 USD. We also noticed that vendors
often specified the size of the pill, being it 200mg, 250mg, or 500mg. The azythromicin was usually sold
together with hydroxychloroquine as a prescription against COVID-19. One example of it was “hydrox-
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ychloroquine sulfate 200mg and azithromycin 250mg,” where an unknown quantity of these drugs was
sold for 40 USD.
In the COVID-19 category of medical frauds, the most prominent listings were vaccines. Despite at the
moment of writing of this manuscript (July 2020), vaccines are far from being actually developed, they
were sold in DWMs since March 2020. These listings included both low price vaccines like “complete
order free shipment COVID19 VACCINE,” sold at just 200 USD, or high price one like “Covid-19
Vaccine. Lets keep it low key for now,” priced at 15, 000 USD. In addition, among the listings in the
medical frauds category, one could find potentially dangerous illicit drug mixes with claimed curative
power against COVID-19, like “Protect yourself from the corona virus:” a marijuana based drug mix
supposedly helpful in recovery from coronavirus infection. Other medical frauds included a 300 USD
“CORONAVIRUS DETECtOR DEVICE, SAVE LIVES NOW” or a 1, 000 USD “Buy CORONAVIRUS
THERMO METER.”
Tests for COVID-19 were also moderately present in DWMs during the pandemic. We detected
listings in the tests category both at low quantities, such as, “25 pcs COVID-19 (coronavirus) quick
test,” sold for 430 USD, or at very large one, like “Corona Virus Test / Covid-19 Test Kits ( 5000Pcs),”
for a price of 7,500 USD.
The two listings in the ventilator category were ICU ventilators. They were advertising fundamental
hospital instrument, such as, “ICU Respiratory Ventilators , Emergency Room Vents” sold at 800 USD
or “BiPAP oxygen concentrator ventilato Amid Covid-19” for 2, 000 USD.
B.2 COVID-19 mentions
We describe three examples of listings in the COVID-19 mentions category. The listing with title
“Best Organic Virginia Bright Tobacco Premium quality 600g” refers to the lockdown in its body as
“unfortunately we have to respect coronavirus lockdowns, in order to ensure as much security as possible,
we had to choose one type of shiping that is unfortunately much more expensive while lockdowns last.”
Another listing with title “(Out of Stock! Lower Price for Pre-orders Only) Testosterone Enanthate
250mg/ml - 10ml - Buy 4 Get 1,” mentions in the body that they “are currently out of stock of this
product due to our oil suppliers not being able to get their raw powders shipped to them because of the
Coronavirus” and they “have lowered the price a little to help make up for this delay.” A third listing
mention a sale directly in the title “COVID-19 SPECIAL OFFER 1GR CROWN BOLIVIAN COCAINE
90% 65,” and link the discount with the distress caused by the pandemic.
C Timeline of the COVID-19 pandemic
In this Section we aim at providing a summary of the main events related to the pandemic, focusing on
the ones cited in the main text and listed in table 6. This is by no means a complete summary of the
COVID-19 pandemic timeline.
The first event to gain international attention and make the public aware of the coronavirus was the
decision from China to lockdown the city of Wuhan, first epicenter of the pandemic, on the January
23 2020.1 The virus then found its way to Europe, where the first country to be heavily hit by the
pandemic was Italy. The Italian government decided to lockdown the entire country on March 9 2020.59
The virus rapidly spread in Europe and internationally, with cases appearing more and more in the
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United States, leading USA’s President Donald Trump to first take a stance on the possibility of using
chloroquine to cure individuals infected from COVID on the March 18 2020.62 The epidemic started to
heavily hit the United States, with New York City declaring the lockdown on March 22 2020,78 and the
cases were surging almost everywhere in the world: 70 days after the lockdown of Wuhan, the worldwide
count of infections had already surpassed 1 Million cases67 on April 3 2020. At that point, President
Trump explicitly promoted the use of hydroxychloroquine on April 5 2020, before any official medical
trial ended.65 In April the situation started to become asymmetric. In Europe, thanks to the many
policies in place, the COVID-19 became less threatening64 and lockdowns started to be eased. USA
and other countries were instead seeing a rise in cases. President Trump declared he was now taking
Hydroxychloroquine preventively against COVID-19 on May 18 2020 and the USA were the first to
register 100, 000 deaths on May 27 2020. During June 2020, Europe has maintained COVID-19 under
control, while the USA is having a second wave in cases related with COVID-19.
Table 6: Significant COVID-19 events. We defined an acronym for each event and reported it in the
main text plots. Please note that this list does not intend to be exhaustive or to establish a ranking
between events.
Date Event Acronym
2020-1-23 Wuhan Lockdown1 Wuhan
2020-3-9 Italy Lockdown59 Italy
2020-3-18 USA’s President Trump first refers to chloroquine62 Trump 1
2020-3-22 New York City Lockdown78 NYC
2020-4-3 1M COVID-19 cases worldwide67 1M cases
2020-4-5
USA’s President Trump promotes the use of
Trump 2
chloroquine and hydroxychloroquine against COVID-1965
2020-4-24 COVID-19 cases in Europe are beggining to slow down64 Europe
2020-5-18
USA’s President Trump declares he is taking
Trump 3
hydroxychloroquine preventively against COVID-1966
2020-5-27 100k COVID-19 deaths in the USA79 100k USA deaths
D Supplementary material
In this Section we provide additional material that support our main findings. In table 7 we provide
more details on the 23 dark web marketplaces considered in our study. In particular we indicate the main
specialization of the markets, i.e., the main category of products sold. If it is “Mixed”, it means that
the marketplace is not specialised in any particular category of goods. In the description we instead put
information on the markets, with more details where available. All this information has been researched
and compiled by the authors, with particular help given by Flashpoint Intelligence.58
In table 8 we provide a table reporting the different COVID-19 related medicines which were found
in the listings. The medicines were selected as they have been found or claimed to be effective against
COVID-19.21 The number of listings related to each medicine is also reported, noting that some listings
sell more than one medicine (e.g. listings selling both hydroxychloroquine and azitrhomycin).
In figure 7 we plot the distribution of listings per vendor in log-log plot, showing a clear power-law
shape with exponent -2.0. In the inset of figure 7, we show the histogram using linear spacing, through
which we understand that most vendors sold very few COVID-19 specific listings, while few vendors
going as high as 91 different listings. We noted that 80% of the vendors had indeed less or equal than 5
listings.
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In order to complement figure 5(a) and (b) in the main text and properly show the peaks of Wikipedia
page visits and tweets, we create figure 8. The new representation of figure 5 does not modify the claims
made in the main text and how major event related with COVID-19 impacted public attention.
Table 7: List of all dark web marketplaces, together with their specialization and a brief description.
DWM Specialization Description
Black Market Guns Weapons
Weapons Marketplace, now exit scammed
according to onion.live45
CanadaHQ Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency marketplace
Cannabay Drugs
Russian language drug marketplace
focusing on cannabis
Cannazon Drugs (Cannabis) Drug marketplace for cannabis products only
Connect Mixed
A social network that hosts a marketplace
for the sale of illicit goods
DarkBay/DBay Mixed
Multivendor cryptocurrency marketplace selling
digital goods, drugs, and services
Dark Market Mixed
Multivendor cryptocurrency marketplace selling
digital goods, drugs, and services
Darkseid Weapons Weapons marketplace
ElHerbolario Drugs
Single-vendor shop, selling just 3 products,
primarily leaning towards Cannabis
Empire Mixed
Alphabay-style marketplace with BTC, LTC, XMR,
MultiSig, and PGP 2FA
Genesis Digital goods
Marketplace selling digital identities for account
takeover activities
Hydra Drugs Russian language drug marketplace
MEGA Darknet Mixed Russian language marketplace
Plati.Market Digital goods digital goods marketplace
Rocketr Digital goods Marketplace for the sale of illicit digital goods
Selly Digital goods Marketplace for the sale of illicit digital goods
Shoppy.gg Digital goods Marketplace for the sale of illicit digital goods
Skimmer Device Skimmer devices Marketplace selling skimmer devices
Tor Market Drugs
Drug-focused marketplace focused on supplying
the drug marketplace in New Zealand
Venus Anonymous Mixed
Multivendor marketplace selling
digital goods and drugs
White House Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency marketplace
Wilhaben Mixed
German language marketplace for the sale
of illicit goods
Yellow Brick Mixed Multivendor cryptocurrency marketplace
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Table 8: COVID-19 related medicines appearing in the listings, together with a brief description and the
number of listings related to that drug.
Medicine Description Listings
Chloroquine Malaria medication 59
Hydroxychloroquine Malaria medication 56
Azitrhomycin Antibiotic often paired with hydroxychloroquine 30
Favipiravir Antiviral medication used to treat influenza 5
Remdesivir Antiviral medication 3
Lopiravir Antiviral medication used to treat HIV 1
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Figure 7: Probability distribution function (Pdf) for the number of listings per vendor. The power law
fit results in an exponent of -2.0. In inset, the histogram of the number of listings per vendor, with a
vertical line showing the 80th percentile.
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Figure 8: Wikipedia page visits for pages relative to (a) PPE, (b) hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine
and azitrhomycin. Number of tweets mentioning (c) PPE, (d) hydroxychloroquine, chloroquine and
azitrhomycin. Panels (a) and (b) corresponds to figure 5(a) in the main text, while panels (c) and (d)
to figure 5(b). The main difference between these panels and figure 5(a) and (b) is the linear scale on y
axis.
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